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COMMENTS
THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT AND AUSTRALIA'S
DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION ACT: OVERCOMING THE
INADEQUACIES
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States is not a newcomer to the disability
legislation arena. Efforts to protect the civil rights of Americans
with disabilities1 began as early as the 1940s.2 These initial
endeavors led to the enactment of legislation such as the Civil
Rights Act of 19643 and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 4 and
culminated in the passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act
of 1990 (ADA). 5 Today, in addition to federal legislation, many
states have enacted their own disability discrimination laws.6
1. This Comment uses the phrase "individual [or person] with a disability," to refer
to members of the disability community. Activists in the disability rights movement
endorse this phrase "over such phrases as 'disabled people,' ... or 'the disabled,"' because
it "emphasizes personhood rather than the disability." Jonathan C. Drimmer, Comment,
Cripples, Overcomers, and Civil Rights: Tracing the Evolution of Federal Legislation and
Social Policy for People with Disabilities, 40 UCLA L. REV. 1341, 1342 n.2 (1993). For
information about "people first" terminology, see ADAPTIVE ENVIRONMENTS CENTER,
INC., THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT FACT SHEET SERIES, FACT SHEET No.
3, COMMUNICATING WITH PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES (1992).
2. For example, in 1948, Congress enacted a statute to prevent employment
discrimination against individuals with disabilities in the federal civil service. See Act of
June 10, 1948, ch. 434, Pub. L. No. 80-617, 62 Stat. 351 (codified in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.); see also GERARD QUINN ET AL., DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION LAW IN THE
UNITED STATES, AUSTRALIA AND CANADA 19 (1993).
3. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-2000e-17 (1994) (prohibiting
discrimination in places of public accommodation).
4. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (1994) (prohibiting employment
discrimination by federal agencies and recipients of federal funding).
5. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994)
[hereinafter ADA].
6. See, e.g., Unruh Civil Rights Act, CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 51-54 (West 1982)
(prohibiting discrimination in the State of California).
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In stark contrast, Australia did not, until recently, enact
federal legislation to address disability discrimination issues. The
1992 Disability Discrimination Act (DDA)7 represents the
Australian Commonwealth's first attempt to develop protections
for individuals with disabilities.8 On its face, the DDA potentially
surpasses the ADA's comprehensiveness and effectiveness
because the DDA defines "disability" 9 in broader terms than does
the ADA.10  The DDA may thus afford protection to more
individuals with disabilities than does the ADA. Unfortunately,
the DDA's comprehensiveness does not extend beyond its
preliminary definitions; consequently, the protections the DDA
provides are often inconsequential.
This Comment analyzes and compares the disability laws of
Australia and the United States and proffers that an amalgamation
of the two nations' laws would be the most effective way to afford
persons with disabilities the protections to which they are entitled.
Part II of this Comment discusses the ADA's history and content.
Part III summarizes the DDA and its history. Part IV compares
the two disability discrimination laws, enumerates the strengths
and weaknesses of each, and discusses the effects of these
strengths and weaknesses on case law. Finally, Part V proposes
that the most viable solution to alleviate the weaknesses in both
7. Disability Discrimination Act, 1992 (Austl.) [hereinafter DDA].
8. See QUINN ET AL., supra note 2, at 123 (noting that the DDA is "the only
Australian anti-discrimination statute dealing exclusively with disability discrimination.").
9. The DDA defines "disability" as one of the following:
(a) total or partial loss of bodily or mental functions;
(b) total or partial loss of a part of the body;
(c) the presence in the body of organisms causing disease or illness;
(d) the presence in the body of organisms capable of causing disease or illness;
(e) the malfunction, malformation or disfigurement of a part of the body;
(f) a disorder or malfunction that results in the person learning differently from
a person without the disorder or malfunction;
(g) a disorder, illness or disease that affects the thought processes, perception of
reality, emotions or judgment or that results in disturbed behavior; and includes
a disability that:
(h) presently exists; or
(i) previously existed but no longer exists; or
(j) may exist in the future; or
(k) is imputed to a person ....
DDA § 4(1)(a)-(k).
10. For purposes of the ADA, an individual has a "disability" if the individual "(A)
[has] a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major
life activities of such an individual; (B) [has] a record of such an impairment; or (C) [is]
regarded as having such an impairment." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A)-(C) (1994).
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the ADA and the DDA entails drafting new legislation that
combines the most expansive language from each law. This
revamping will create comprehensive and effective legislation that
will provide meaningful safeguards to prevent discrimination
against all individuals with disabilities.
II. DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION LEGISLATION IN THE UNITED
STATES
Congress enacted a multitude of disability anti-discrimination
laws predating the ADA.11 This history of protective legislation
enlightened the American public and engendered a compassionate
understanding of the needs and rights of the disability
community. 12 In turn, this awareness fostered the American
public's collective perception that accommodating people with
disabilities is a "necessary means of providing equal rights.' 13
Despite public awareness and volumes of legislation, "no federal
law prohibited the majority of employers, program administrators,
[and] owners . . . of places of public accommodation . . . from
discriminating at will against people with disabilities"'14 until the
ADA's enactment. "[A]s late as early 1990 Americans with
disabilities continued to suffer discrimination in all walks of life."' 15
In 1990, Congress enacted the ADA to "signal[] the end to the
unjustified segregation and exclusion of persons with disabilities
from the mainstream of American life.' 16
11. See BONNIE POITRAS TUCKER, FEDERAL DISABILITY LAW IN A NUTSHELL 4-5
(2d ed. 1998) (noting that some of the most prominent of these laws include:
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (1994); Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1485 (1994); Architectural Barriers Act of 1968, 42
U.S.C. §§ 4151-4157 (1994); Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-
3619 (1994); Child Abuse Amendments of 1984,42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5106, 5111-5113, 5115,
10401 (1994)).
12. See Bonnie Poitras Tucker, The Disability Discrimination Act: Ensuring Rights of
Australians with Disabilities, Particularly Hearing Impairments, 21 MONASH U. L. REV.
15, 16-17 (1995).
13. Id. (commenting on the civil rights consciousness in the United States, as
compared to the general absence of such a consciousness in Australia).
14. TUCKER, supra note 11, at 5.
15. Id.
16. Statement by President George Bush Upon Signing [the ADA], 26 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. DOC. 1165, 1166 (July 30,1990) [hereinafter Statement by President Bush].
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A. The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
The ADA is divided into five substantive parts: Titles I
through V. This Comment focuses primarily on Titles I, II, and
III, which respectively address employment discrimination, public
services offered by public entities, and public accommodations,
services, and amenities offered by private entities.
17
On July 26, 1990, President George Bush signed the ADA
into law.18 According to President Bush, the ADA was a clear
expression by the American people of "[their] most basic ideals of
freedom and equality."' 19 President Bush declared that the new
legislation "promise[d] to open up all aspects of American life to
individuals with disabilities... ."20 Upon enactment, the ADA's
immediate purpose was to provide: (1) "a clear and comprehensive
national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against
individuals with disabilities;" 21 (2) "clear, strong, consistent,
enforceable standards addressing discrimination against
individuals with disabilities;" 22 and (3) "to ensure that the Federal
Government plays a central role in enforcing the standards
established... on behalf of individuals with disabilities." 23
To qualify for protection under the ADA, an individual must
have an "impairment," as described in the ADA's definition of
"disability." The ADA defines "an individual with a disability" as
one who: (1) has "a physical or mental impairment 24 that
17. See QUINN ET AL., supra note 2, at 45 (discussing the ADA's five titles). Title IV
addresses telecommunications services. See 47 U.S.C. § 225 (1994). Title V addresses
miscellaneous matters. See 42 U.S.C. § 12201 (1994). Congress assigned the
responsibilities of regulating compliance with and enforcement of the ADA as follows: the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) (Title I); see 42 U.S.C. § 12116; the
U.S. Attorney General (U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ)) (Titles II and III, except for
the transportation provisions); see 42 U.S.C. § 12134; the Department of Transportation
(DOT) (Title II and Title III transportation provisions); see 42 U.S.C. § 12149.
18. See QUINN ET AL., supra note 2, at 45.
19. Statement by President George Bush, 26 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. at 1165.
20. Id.
21. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1).
22. Id. § 12101(b)(2).
23. Id. § 12101(b)(3).
24. The term "physical or mental impairment" means:
(1) Any physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or
anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following body systems:
neurological, musculskeletal, special sense organs, respiratory (including speech
organs), cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary, hemic and
lymphatic, skin and endocrine, or (2) Any mental or psychological disorder, such
as mental retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness and
[Vol. 22:51
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substantially limits25 one or more of the major life activities of
such an individual;" 26 (2) has "a record of such an impairment; 27
or (3) is "regarded as having such an impairment. '2 8 The extent of
the protection afforded to an individual with a disability depends
on the nature of the entity providing the protection and the type of
impairment involved.
1. Employment Discrimination: Title 129
Title I of the ADA is designed "to prevent employers from
discriminating against qualified employees with disabilities." 30 It
provides, in pertinent part, that no covered entity "shall
discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because
of the disability of such an individual in regard to job application
specific learning disabilities.
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1)-(2) (1998).
25. The term, "substantially limits," means:
(i) Unable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the general
population can perform; or
(ii) Significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under which
an individual can perform a particular life activity as compared to the condition,
manner, or duration under which the average person in the general population
can perform that same major life activity.
Id. § 1630.26)(1)(i)-(ii).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A). "Major life activities" means "functions such as caring
for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing,
learning and working." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i).
27. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B).
28. Id. § 12102(2)(C). The phrase "is regarded as having.., an impairment" means:
(1) Has a physical or mental impairment that does not substantially limit major
life activities but that is treated by a covered entity as constituting such
limitation;
(2) Has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits major life
activities only as a result of the attitudes of others toward such impairment; or
(3) Has [no qualified impairment] but is treated by a private entity as having a
substantially limiting impairment.
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(l)(1)-(3). See generally Christopher David Ruiz Cameron & Matthias
Wagner, Unchained Maladies: The Proper Treatment of Asymptomatic Diseases as
"Disabilities" Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 12 CAL. LAB. & EMP. L.Q. 3, 5
(1998) (discussing the three categories of ADA disabilities).
29. The Title I provisions effective on July 27, 1992 apply to all private and public
employers with 25 or more employees. See Pub. L. No. 101-336, § 108, 104 Stat. 327, 337
(1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A)). On July 26, 1994, Title I also became
effective for employers with 15-24 employees. See id. See also Sande Pond, An Overview
of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), LEGAL SERVICES SEC. NEWS (St. Bar Cal.
Legal Serv. Section, San Francisco, Cal.), Fall 1993, at 14.
30. Sande L. Buhai, Practice Makes Perfect: Reasonable Accommodation of Law
Students with Disabilities in Clinical Placements, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 137, 142 (1999).
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procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees,
employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions,
and privileges of employment."
'31
A "covered entity" is an "employer,32 employment agency,
labor organization, or joint labor-management committee."
33
Title I prohibits covered entities from discriminating against
"qualified individuals;" that is, those who, "with or without
reasonable accommodation, 34  can perform the essential
functions 35 of the employment position that such an individual
holds or desires." 36 Only those individuals with disabilities that
are able to perform the "essential functions" of a job "stand to
gain under Title 1.,'3 7  Therefore, ascertaining the essential
functions of an employment position is critical in determining
whether an individual with a disability qualifies for reasonable
accommodation under the ADA. 38  The following House
Committee Report explains the "interrelationship between the
31. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
32. Effective July 26, 1994, an "'employer' means a person engaged in an industry
affecting commerce who has 15 or more employees for each working day in each of 20 or
more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such
person." 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A).
33. Id. § 12111(2).
34. Examples of workplace accommodations might include: "instructions [provided]
both orally and in writing, frequent and specific feedback from supervisors, quiet
workspace, and training course accommodations." Patricia H. Latham, Learning
Disabilities and the Law After High School: An Overview for Students, LEARNING
DISABILITIES ASS'N NEWSBRIEFS (Learning Disabilities Assoc. Am., Pittsburgh, Pa.),
July-Aug. 1998, at 3.
35. The term, "essential functions," means "the fundamental job duties of the
employment position that the individual with a disability holds or desires. The term
'essential functions' does not include the marginal functions of the position." 29 C.F.R. §
1630.2(n)(1) (1998).
Evidence of whether a particular function is essential includes, but is not limited
to:
(i) The employer's judgement as to which functions are essential;
(ii) Written job descriptions prepared before advertising or interviewing
applicants for the job;
(iii) The amount of time spent on the job performing the function;
(iv) The consequence of not requiring the incumbent to perform the function;
(v) The terms of a collective bargaining agreement;
(vi) The work experience of past incumbents on the job; and/or
(vii) The current work experience of incumbents in similar jobs.
Id. § 1630.2(n)(3)(i)-(vii).
36. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).
37. QUINN ET AL., supra note 2, at 57.
38. See Buhai, supra note 30, at 145.
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'essential function' requirement and the 'reasonable
accommodation requirement:'
39
If a person with a disability applies for a job and meets all the
selection criteria except one that he or she cannot meet because
of a disability, the criterion must concern an essential, non-
marginal aspect of the job, and be carefully tailored to measure
the person's actual ability to do this essential function of the
job. If the criterion meets this test, it is nondiscriminatory on its
face and it is otherwise lawful under the [ADA]. However, the
criterion may not be used to exclude an applicant with a
disability if the criterion can be satisfied by the applicant with a
reasonable accommodation. A reasonable accommodation may
entail adopting an alternative, less discriminatory criterion.
40
Finally, an "accommodation is not reasonable if it would
impose an 'undue hardship' on [an] employer's business."
41
Consequently, employers are relieved of their duty to comply with
the ADA if they demonstrate that such hardship would result.
42
In order to qualify for the "undue hardship exemption," 43 the
employer's hardship must entail "significant difficulty or
expense." 44  Although the standards set by the ADA serve as
39. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 71 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303,
353-354.
40. Id.
41. TUCKER, supra note 11, at 82; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(A). For the ADA
"undue hardship" exemption, see 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A); see also 29 C.F.R. §
1630.2(p) (1998).
42. See generally TUCKER, supra note 11, at 82.
43. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). "[W]hen enacting the ADA[,] Congress refused
to apply a presumption that any accommodation that cost more than ten percent of a[n
individual with a disability's] salary would constitute an undue hardship." TUCKER, supra
note 11, at 84. Rather, "[e]ach case must be decided on an individual basis." Id. In
determining whether an accommodation imposes an undue hardship on a covered entity,
the following factors are considered:
(i) The nature and net cost of the accommodation...;
(ii) The overall financial resources of the facility or facilities involved in the
provision of the reasonable accommodation, the number of persons employed at
such facility, and the effect on expenses and resources;
(iii) The overall financial resources of the covered entity, the overall size of the
business of the covered entity with respect to the number of its employees, and
the number, type and location of its facilities;
(iv) The type of operation ... of the covered entity... ; and
(v) The impact of the accommodation upon the operation of the facility,
including the impact on the ability of other employees to perform their duties
and the impact on the facility's ability to conduct business.
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(p)(2)(i)-(v) (1998).
44. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(A). See Paul K. Longmore, Disrespecting Disabilities, 18
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helpful guidelines in making the aforementioned Title I
determinations, each case is determined individually.
2. Discrimination with Respect to Public Services Offered by
Public Entities: Title 1145
Title II of the ADA addresses public entities "and their
responsibility to comply with the ADA's nondiscrimination
standards." 46 In a sense, Title II "operationalises the concept of
equality in the context of [public] services." 47  The Title II
prohibition on discrimination stipulates that: "no qualified
individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be
excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the
services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected
to discrimination by any such entity." 48 A "public entity" is (1)
"any State or local government;" 49 (2) "any department, agency,
special purpose district or other instrumentality of a State or States
or local government;" 50 and (3) any "commuter authority." 51 To
comply with the ADA, these entities must: "operate each service,
program or activity so that the service, program, or activity, when
viewed in its entirety, is readily accessible to and usable by
individuals with disabilities." 52 Existing buildings "altered by, on
behalf of, or for the use of a public entity . . . , [must] to the
maximum extent feasible, be altered in such a manner that the
altered portion of the facility is readily accessible to and usable by
individuals with disabilities. . . ."53 Title II applies more exacting
rules to new facilities constructed by public entities. Each new
building must "be designed and constructed in such a manner that
the facility is readily accessible to and usable by individuals with
disabilities . .5. 4
CAL. LAW. 48, 86 (1998) (discussing the cost of job accommodations, nearly 70% of which
cost $500.00 or less).
45. The Title II provisions took effect on January 26, 1992. See Pub. L. No. 101-336, §
205(a), 104 Stat. 327, 338 (1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12131).
46. Buhai, supra note 30, at 150.
47. QUINN ET AL., supra note 2, at 85.
48. 42 U.S.C. § 12132.
49. Id. § 12131(1)(A).
50. Id. § 12131(1)(B).
51. Id. § 12131(1)(C).
52. 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(a) (1998).
53. Id. § 35.151(b) ("[I]f the alteration was commenced after January 26, 1992.").
54. Id. § 35.151(a).
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Title II does not require that all existing facilities be
physically accessible, nor does it require any action that "would
threaten or destroy the significance of an historic property."
55
Any action that a public entity demonstrates "would result in a
fundamental alteration in the nature of a service, program, or
activity or in undue financial and administrative burdens..." is
also not required.
56
3. Discrimination with Respect to Public Accommodations,
Services, and Amenities Offered by Private Entities: Title II157
Title III of the ADA applies to "privately funded 'public
accommodations' and owners of 'commercial facilities affecting
commerce."' 58 A "place of public accommodation" is a facility
owned, leased, leased to, or operated by a private entity59 whose
operations affect commerce. 60  All places of public
55. Id. § 35.150(a)(1)-(2).
56. Id § 35.150(a)(3).
57. The Title III provisions took effect on January 26, 1992. See Pub. L. No. 101-336,
§ 310(a), 104 Stat. 327, 365 (1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12181 (1994)).
58. Pond, supra note 29, at 15. Commercial facilities are facilities "(A) that are
intended for non-residential use; and (B) whose operations will affect commerce." 42
U.S.C. § 12181(2)(A)-(B). The requirements for commercial facilities are more limited
than the requirements for public accommodations. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 12183 (requiring
that commercial facilities merely ensure that new construction and alterations are
accessible) with 42 U.S.C. § 12182 (imposing extensive obligations on places of public
accommodation).
59. See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a).
60. See id. § 12181(7). The term "commerce" means "travel, trade, traffic, commerce,
transportation, or communication-(A) among the several States; (B) between any
foreign country or any territory or possession and any State; or (C) between points in the
same State but through another State or foreign country." 42 U.S.C. § 12181(1). Private
entities are considered public accommodations if the operations of such entities affect
commerce that falls into one of twelve categories:
(A) an inn, hotel, motel, or other place of lodging, except for an establishment
located within a building that contains not more than five rooms for rent or hire
and that is actually occupied by the proprietor of such establishment as the
residence of such proprietor;
(B) a restaurant, bar, or other establishment serving food or drink;
(C) a motion picture house, theater, concert hall, stadium, or other place of
exhibition or entertainment;
(D) an auditorium, convention center, lecture hall, or other place of public
gathering;
(E) a bakery, grocery store, clothing store, hardware store, shopping center, or
other sales or rental establishment;
(F) a laundromat, dry-cleaner, bank, barber shop, beauty shop, travel service,
shoe repair service, funeral parlor, gas station, office of an accountant or lawyer,
pharmacy, insurance office, professional office of a health care provider,
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accommodation must comply with Title III because unlike Title I,
Title III makes "no allowance ... for the smallness of the covered
entity." 6
1
Public accommodations must not provide different or
separate goods, services, or facilities to individuals with disabilities
"unless differentiation or separation are required to provide truly
equal opportunity." 62 In addition, public accommodations may
not require that individuals with disabilities participate in separate
programs if they prefer to participate in equivalent programs
provided for other individuals. 63  Where necessary, Title III
entities must make "reasonable modifications" to policies,
practices, and procedures to allow individuals with disabilities to
fully enjoy facilities, services, privileges, advantages, and
accommodations. 6
4
hospital, or other service establishment;
(G) a terminal, depot, or other station used for specified public transportation;
(H) a museum, library, gallery, or other place of public display or collection;
(I) a park, zoo, amusement park, or other place of recreation;
(J) a nursery, elementary, secondary, undergraduate, or postgraduate private
school, or other place of education;
(K) a day care center, senior citizen center, homeless shelter, food bank,
adoption agency, or other social service center establishment; and
(L) a gymnasium, health spa, bowling alley, golf course, or other place of
exercise or recreation.
Id. § 12181(7)(A)-(L).
61. QUINN ET AL., supra note 2, at 98. Compare Title III, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)
(applying to all private entities whose operations affect commerce) with Title I, 42 U.S.C.
§ 12111(5)(A) (applying only to employers with 15 or more employees).
62. Pond, supra note 29, at 15 (referring to the ADA's "separate benefit" provision,
42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(a)(iii)).
63. See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(B)-(C). "[A]ccommodations shall be afforded to an
individual with a disability in the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of the
individual." Id. § 12182(b)(1)(B). "Notwithstanding the existence of separate or different
programs or activities . . . . an individual with a disability shall not be denied the
opportunity to participate in such programs or activities that are not separate or
different." Id. § 12182(b)(1)(C).
64. See id. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii). The "specific prohibition" on discrimination
includes:
a failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures,
when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities,
privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless
the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally
alter the nature of such goods services, facilitates, privileges, advantages, or
accommodations ....
Id. Thus, such modifications will generally be deemed reasonable unless they are so
drastic as to "require the public accommodation to significantly alter the nature of its
business." Pond, supra note 29, at 15 (footnote omitted).
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Title III public accommodations must provide appropriate
auxiliary aids and services to ensure that communication with
individuals with disabilities is as effective as with other
individuals. 65 Existing structural barriers must be removed to the
extent that such removal is "readily achievable." 66  All newly
constructed facilities, as well as all areas of existing buildings that
undergo remodeling, 67 must be accessible to individuals with
disabilities to the "maximum extent feasible." 68
Under Title III, discrimination arises when public
accommodations:
impose or apply eligibility criteria that screen out or tend to
screen out an individual with a disability . . .from fully and
equally enjoying any goods, services, facilities, privileges,
advantages, or accommodations, unless such criteria can be
shown to be necessary for the provision of the goods, services,
facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations being
offered.
69
Although a public entity may impose legitimate safety
requirements that are necessary for safe operation, it may only
impose such requirements when they are based on "actual risks
and not on mere speculation, stereotypes, or generalizations about
individuals with disabilities." 70 Title III does not apply where the
65. See Pond, supra note 29, at 15.
66. Removal of a structural barrier is "readily achievable" if it is "easily
accomplishable and able to be carried out without much difficulty or expense." 42 U.S.C.
§ 12181(9).
67. These provisions apply to buildings that undergo remodeling after Title III took
effect on January 26, 1992. See id. § 12181.
68. 28 C.F.R. § 35.151(b) (1998). Making physically altered portions of buildings
accessible to individuals with disabilities will be deemed "feasible" unless the "cost and
scope of such alterations is disproportionate to the cost of the overall alteration." Id. §
36.403(a). When physical alterations of buildings are undertaken, providing an accessible
path of travel for individuals with disabilities may include: "widening doorways or
installing ramps;" id. § 36.403(f)(2)(i); "making restrooms accessible;" id. § 36.403(f)(2)(ii);
relocating telephones to "an accessible height;" id. § 36.403(f)(2)(iii); and relocating
"inaccessible drinking fountain[s];" id. § 36.403(f)(2)(iv).
69. 28 C.F.R. § 36.301(a).
70. Id. § 36.301(b). Examples of safety qualifications that are necessary to the safe
operation of a public accommodation "that would be justifiable in appropriate
circumstances would include height requirements for certain amusement park rides or a
requirement that all participants in a recreational rafting expedition be able to meet a
necessary level of swimming proficiency." 28 C.F.R. pt. 36 app. B § 36.301 (1998).
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risks associated with the individual pose a "direct threat to the
health and safety of others. "
71
Collectively, the ADA's titles represent revolutionary steps in
the fight to end disability discrimination. Legislative design flaws
and judicial misinterpretation, however, have brought the United
States' progress to a standstill. Unless remedied, these
impediments will preclude the ADA from fully achieving its
purpose. 72
III. DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION LEGISLATION IN AUSTRALIA
Although some general anti-discrimination legislation
appeared in Australia at the state level as early as 1966,73 the
Australian Commonwealth Government made no attempt to
control discrimination, of any kind, until the mid-1970s.
74
Thereafter, a majority of Australian states followed the national
legislature by implementing state anti-discrimination laws.
75
These early state laws primarily addressed race and sex
discrimination.76  Today, virtually all Australian state anti-
discrimination laws also cover the issue of "discrimination on
grounds of disability." 77 The state laws, however, were neither
"sufficient, by themselves, to eliminate discrimination nor . ..
[adequate] to provide complainants with complete redress."
78
Thus, in keeping with the "global movement for human rights or
civil liberties," 79 the Australian Commonwealth designed the
DDA to "fill gaps" 80 in many of the existing state laws with respect
71. 28 C.F.R. § 36.208(a). A "direct threat" is "a significant risk to the health or
safety of others that cannot be eliminated by a modification of policies, practices, or
procedures or by the provision of auxiliary aids or services." Id § 36.208(b).
72. See infra Part IV.D (discussing the ADA's weaknesses).
73. See, e.g., Prohibition of Discrimination Act, 1966 (S. Austl.) (prohibiting race
discrimination in Southern Australia).
74. See, e.g., Racial Discrimination Act, 1975 (Austl.); Sex Discrimination Act, 1984
(Austl.).
75. Examples of Australian state anti-discrimination laws enacted from 1977 to 1991
include: Anti-Discrimination Act, 1977 (N.S.W.); Equal Opportunities Act, 1984 (Vict.);
Equal Opportunities Act, 1984 (S. Austl.); Anti-Discrimination Act, 1991 (Queensl.).
76. See, e.g., Prohibition of Discrimination Act, 1966 (S. Austl.).
77. QUINN ET AL., supra note 2, at 123.
78. Melissa Conley Tyler, Law and Change, The Disability Discrimination Act 1992:
Genesis, Drafting and Prospects, 19 MELB. U. L. REV. 211, 217 (1993).
79. Id. at 215.
80. QUINN ET AL., supra note 2, at 124. See also Caroline Milburn, Australia: A
Mission to Outlaw Bias Against Disabled, AGE (Melbourne), Feb. 27, 1993, at 4.
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to disability issues. Modeled in part after the ADA, 81 the DDA
appears, on its face, to equal or even surpass the ADA's
comprehensiveness. Upon close examination, however, it is clear
that behind the thin veneer of its inclusive vocabulary, the DDA's
implementation has been largely ineffective.
82
The Australian Disability Discrimination Act
83
The DDA represents the Australian Commonwealth's first
legislative effort dealing exclusively with the problem of disability
discrimination.84 Upon enactment, the DDA's objectives were:
(a) "to eliminate, as far as possible, discrimination against persons
on the ground of disability . . . ;"85 (b) "to ensure, as far as
practicable, that persons with disabilities have the same rights to
equality before the law as the rest of the community;" 86 and (c) "to
promote recognition and acceptance within the community of the
principle that persons with disabilities have the same fundamental
rights as the rest of the community." 8
7
Although the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity
Commission (HREOC) modeled the DDA loosely after the
ADA, 88 when drafting the DDA, 89 the HREOC "expressly
81. See Tucker, supra note 12, at 15.
82. See infra Parts IV.B.1-5 (discussing the DDA's weaknesses).
83. The DDA "commenced operation" on March 1, 1993. Juliet Bourke, Mental
Illness, Discrimination in Employment and the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth.), 3
J.L. & MED. 318,324 (1996).
84. Section 5 of the DDA defines "discrimination" as follows:
(1) [A] person (discriminator) discriminates against another person (aggrieved
person) on the ground of a disability . . . if, because of the aggrieved person's
disability, the discriminator treats or proposes to treat the aggrieved person less
favorably than, in circumstances that are the same or are not materially
different, the discriminator treats or would treat a person without the disability.
(2) [Cjircumstances in which a person treats or would treat another person with
a disability are not materially different because of the fact that different
accommodation or services may be required by the person with a disability.
DDA, 1992, § 5(1)-(2) (Austl.) (internal quotation marks omitted).
85. DDA § 3(a). Section 3(a) of the DDA provides specifically for the elimination of
disability discrimination in the following areas: "(i) work, accommodation, education,
access to premises, clubs and sport; and (ii) the provision of goods, facilities, services and
land; and (iii) existing laws; and (iv) the administration of Commonwealth laws and
programs .... ." Id. § 3(a)(i)-(iv).
86. Id. § 3(b).
87. Id. § 3(c).
88. See Bonnie Poitras Tucker, A Time for Action, 69 L. INST. J. 539, 539 (1995).
89. See QUINN ET AL., supra note 2, at 128 (noting that the DDA's definition closely
adheres to the recommendations in the HREOC's Draft Position Paper).
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rejected" some of the ADA's language.90 Presumably, in rejecting
the ADA's restrictive language, the Commission intended the
DDA to apply to many groups of individuals with disabilities,
including those excluded by the ADA.
The DDA's broad language prohibits discrimination against
individuals with physical disabilities, intellectual disabilities,
mental illnesses and mental diseases.91  It also forbids
discrimination against people who use palliative and therapeutic
devices and aids, interpreters, readers and assistants, and service
animals.92 The Australian legislature "incorporate[d] the United
States' concept of 'unjustifiable hardship' within the [DDA's]
definition of disability discrimination." 93 Therefore, as with the
ADA, employers can use the "unjustifiable hardship" defense to
render disability discrimination lawful, provided the employer
demonstrates that providing accommodation would create such
hardship.9
4
As enacted, the DDA had great potential to provide
protections for Australians with disabilities.95 Unfortunately, in
some circumstances the DDA's implementation has been wholly
ineffective. 96 Although the DDA's language was carefully crafted
with the promise of ensuring that all Australians with disabilities
are protected against discrimination, the Australian legislature
failed to create the type of legislation that can live up to that
promise.
IV. THE STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF THE DDA AND THE
ADA: COMPARING THE SUCCESSES AND INADEQUACIES
The DDA and the ADA were enacted under entirely
different circumstances. 97  The differences in the creation,
enactment, and enforcement of the two laws significantly impact
their relative effectiveness. 98 The ADA's enactment was the result
90. Id. Specifically, the HREOC rejected the ADA's disability definition because it
deemed the definition unnecessarily difficult and underinclusive. See generally id.
91. For the DDA "disability" definition, see supra note 9.
92. See QUINN ET AL., supra note 2, at 137 (citing the DDA, 1992, §§ 7-9 (Austl.)).
93. Tyler, supra note 78, at 221.
94. See generally id.
95. See Tucker, supra note 12, at 21.
96. See infra Parts IV.B.1-5 (discussing the DDA's ineffective implementation).
97. See generally Tucker, supra note 88, at 540.
98. See generally id.
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of the efforts of people with disabilities "and their advocates
throughout the United States." 99 The motivation and driving force
underlying the ADA's passage began at "the grass roots level,"
entailed heavy involvement from specific interest groups, and in
turn, was widely publicized. 100  In contrast, the Australian
Commonwealth initiated and passed the DDA with little or no
public attention,10 1 fanfare, or participation by the disability
community. 10 2 Hence, the Australian public "was, and still is,
generally unaware of the law."
10 3
In the United States, because the public has historically been
exposed to civil rights legislation, it is therefore equipped with a
collective consciousness that recognizes civil rights legislation as a
means for providing equality to disadvantaged groups.
10 4
Conversely, the Australian public, for the most part, is without
such an understanding. 10 5 In Australia, legislation such as the
DDA is widely viewed "as a form of charity, rather than a
necessary means of providing equal rights."'1 6  The continued
existence of this attitude, which "defines the disab[ility]
[community] as 'deserving poor' who are dependent [on] the state
through no fault of their own,"'1 7 undoubtedly hinders the DDA's
performance. It is precisely this type of ignorance that the DDA's
goals of recognizing and promoting equality10 8 seek to eliminate.
The distinctions in "the manner in which the two laws were
passed is significant for three primary reasons."'1 9  First, in
addition to negotiating in an environment that patronizes disability
rights, Australians with disabilities "and their advocates will be in
the awkward position of having to negotiate and compromise with
respect to the promulgation of standards after the DDA's
enactment."" 0 In contrast, the disability community in the United
99. Id. at 539.
100. See id. at 539-540.
101. See Tyler, supra note 78, at 227. "[T]he minimal coverage preceding the
proclamation of the [DDA] ... [evidences the media's lack of concern with disability
issues, and] ... is perhaps symptomatic of a wider disregard." Id.





107. Tyler, supra note 78, at 215 (footnote omitted).
108. See DDA, 1992, § 3(c) (Austl.).
109. Tucker, supra note 88, at 540.
110. Id.
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States played an important role in the ADA's negotiation and
creation, in all stages of the legislative process. 1
11
Second, the HREOC is poorly funded and "place[s] little
emphasis upon resolution of [the few] disability complaints" that it
receives. 112  The Australian Commonwealth worsens this
complacency, because "having passed the DDA, [it now] seems
singularly uninterested in enforcing the Act.' 113 By comparison,
the ADA's enforcement agencies fiercely mandate adherence to
ADA standards. 11
4
Finally, in the United States, Congress afforded federal
agencies one year to develop ADA implementation regulations. 115
Conversely, the Australian Commonwealth set no guidelines or
time requirements for drafting DDA compliance standards;
furthermore, "the Disability Commissioner and her staff estimate
that it will be several years before this [task] is accomplished.'
'116
A. The DDA's Strengths
1. A Comprehensive Disability Definition
The DDA's most notable strength is its broad, inclusive
disability definition. 117 Designed to ensure that "no one should
'fall through the gaps,"' 118 the DDA's definition of "disability" is
"by far the broadest of any yet offered in an anti-discrimination
statute."11 9
The HREOC sought to include within the DDA's protected
classes people whose "disability relates to physical disfigurement,
rather than loss of any functional capacity and who are not limited
in any major life activities but who are nonetheless discriminated
111. See generally id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. For the ADA Accessibility Requirements, see ADA Accessibility Guidelines for
Buildings and Facilities, 28 C.F.R. pt. 36. app. A (1998).
115. See Tucker, supra note 88, at 541.
116. Id.
117. The DDA's expansive disability definition may be overbroad. Traditional
concerns regarding broadly defined protected classes generally focus on the high
implementation costs and increased litigation that may result. These concerns, however,
are almost impossible to gauge in Australia because so few DDA complaints have been
filed. See discussion infra note 181.
118. Tyler, supra note 78, at 220.
119. Id.
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against because of prejudice."'120 The HREOC also intended to
provide DDA protection for people who have "overcome any loss
of capacity (through their own efforts, with or without any
assistance and the use of aids or appliances) .... "121 The
Commission emphasized that "the need for protection against
discrimination does not disappear as a person becomes more able
to participate in the community.'
122
It is questionable whether a person seeking "the assistance of
anti-discrimination law [and] asserting their ability and entitlement
to participate equally may paradoxically find it necessary to argue
that their ability to participate fully is in fact limited by their
impairment in order to qualify for protection under the law."
123
The DDA's drafters recognized the circular nature of this
approach and accordingly rejected the ADA's "substantial
limitation" language.
2. Making Reasonable Adjustments to Accommodate Employees
with Disabilities
Although the DDA does not expressly contain the terms
"reasonable accommodations" and "reasonable adjustments,"'124
the terms are commonly used to describe the obligations imposed
on employers in the DDA's employment discrimination
sections. 125  Accordingly, any employer who fails to make
"reasonable adjustments" to accommodate an employee with a
disability will "be exposed to liability for unlawful discrimination,
even if he or she acted in good faith.' 1 26
120. QUINN ET AL., supra note 2, at 128.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 128 & n.26 (quoting HREOC Draft Position Paper, at 90).
123. Id. at 128.
124. The DDA's "reasonable adjustments" concept is similar to the ADA's Title I
"reasonable accommodations" provision. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). For a discussion of
the ADA "reasonable accommodations" provision, see supra Part II.A.1.
125. See Bourke, supra note 83, at 327. See also, e.g., McNeill v. Australia, No. H94/79,
sec. 2.1, para. 1 (unreported HREOC June 26, 1995) (Austl.) available at (visited Sept. 23,
1999) <http://www.hreoc.gov.au/cgi-bin/programs/view.cgi> (explaining that a reasonable
adjustment is "any form of assistance or adjustment that is necessary, possible and
reasonable to make to working arrangements, work methods, equipment or the work
environment to reduce or eliminate the effects of disabilities." (citation omitted)).
126. Statement by the Disability Discrimination Commissioner; Bourke, supra note 83,
at 329 n.49 and accompanying text (citation omitted).
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The HREOC's decision in McNeill v. Australia 27 illustrates
the DDA "reasonable adjustments" notion. McNeill, an
individual with a visual impairment, was an employee of the
Australian Department of Social Security (Department).
128
During the probationary period of McNeill's employment, the
Department only made marginal accommodations for her
disability.129 When McNeill's probationary period expired, the
Department terminated her employment. 130 The Department
contended that McNeill's dismissal was the result of "poor
conduct, communication and interpersonal skills that were
unrelated to the fact that her equipment was not fully available
and functioning . ... 131 The behaviors criticized by the
Department, however, such as McNeill's "tendency to interrupt
people and make frequent demands of supervisors, are directly
attributable . . . to [her] disability and the mode of behavior she
has adopted over the years to compensate for her limited sight.'
132
The HREOC held that much of McNeill's behavior "reflected her
frustration at her disability not being reasonably accommodated
by the [Department] .... ,,133 Thus, the Commission held that
McNeill's termination was unlawful because it "was brought about
by... her disability-namely,. . . for displaying behavior that was
a manifestation of her disability.' '134
The DDA's "reasonable adjustments" provision is far from
perfect. 135 The McNeill interpretation of the provision, however,
which implies that an employer cannot fire an employee because
127. No. H94/79 (unreported HREOC).
12& See id. sec. 1, para. 1. Although McNeill's disability rendered her legally blind,
with "the provision of special equipment.... there was no doubt that she had the capacity
to do the work." Id. sec. 2, paras. 6-7.
129. See id. sec. 1, para. 4, sec. 2, paras. 11-12, 14. To accommodate McNeill's visual
impairment, her employer initially supplied her with equipment. See generally id. sec. 2.2,
paras. 1-4. The equipment, however, was not sufficient to adequately accommodate her
disability and often did not function properly. See id.
130. See id. sec. 1, para. 4.
131. Id. sec. 3, para. 6.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. sec. 3, para. 7. The Department intensely monitored McNeill's job
performance; prior to one of her probation evaluations, a personnel employee even "sat
beside her on a full-time basis for two weeks .... " Id. sec. 2.4, para. 17.
135. See infra Part IV.B.5 (discussing the weaknesses in the DDA's "reasonable
adjustments" notion).
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of the employee's disability, is an encouraging sign that judicial
interpretation of the DDA is moving in the right direction.
B. The DDA's Weaknesses
Because of the Australian public's unfamiliarity with the
DDA's requirements and implications, case law interpreting and
applying the Act is insubstantial. There are, however, some
decisions that provide a preliminary understanding of the Act's
effectiveness.
1. Performing the Inherent Requirements of an Employment
Position: an Essential Element in Qualifying for DDA Protection
Like the United States, Australia has been forced to address
the Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) and Human
Immunodefiency Virus (HIV) epidemic and its relation to
discrimination disability legislation.136 A revolutionary disability
definition is meaningless if proper implementation and
interpretation do not accompany it. The method Australian courts
use to deal with HIV and AIDS illustrates this axiom.
At issue in X v. Department of Defence137 was whether the
Department of Defence's discharge of X, a soldier who tested HIV
positive, unlawfully violated the DDA.138 Until his discharge, X
worked as a signalman for the Australian Defence Forces
(ADF).139  X signed a pre-enlistment medical history
questionnaire acknowledging that he would be tested for HIV and
other diseases as a part of the ADF's "post-entry medical check"
procedure. 140 When the tests revealed that X was HIV positive,
136. For the DDA provisions addressing AIDS (DDA, 1992, § 4(c) (Austl.) the
presence of organisms "causing disease or illness") and HIV (DDA §4(d) the presence of
organisms "capable of causing disease or illness"), see supra note 9.
137. No. H94\98 (unreported HREOC June 29, 1995) (Austl.) available at (visited
Sept. 23, 1999) <http://www.hreoc.gov.au/cgi-bin/programs/view.cgi> [hereinafter
Department of Defence Case 1, affd sub nom by Australia v. Human Rights & Equal
Opportunity Comm'n, No. BC9605184, 1996 Aust. Fedct. LEXIS 859 (Austl.) [hereinafter
Department of Defence Case I1], vacated, (1998) 152 A.L.R. 182 (Austl.) [hereinafter
Department of Defence Case II]. See generally Fed: Bishop Says HIV Soldier Would Not
be Deployable, AUSTRALIAN ASSOCIATED PRESS (AAP) NEWSFEED (Sydney), Jan. 14,
1998, available in LEXIS, Aust Library, Aapnew File.
138. See Department of Defence Case I, No. H94\98 sec. 1, para. 2; for a discussion of
other cases involving HIV and AIDS discrimination by the ADF, see Gareth Boreham,
Australia: AIDS Officers Claim Unfair Treatment, AGE (Melbourne), Oct. 5, 1994, at 5.
139. See Department of Defence Case I, No. H94\98 sec. 3, para. 3.
140. Department of Defence Case I1, 1996 Aust. Fedct. LEXIS 859 at *3-4. The
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the ADF discharged him. 141 At the time of his discharge, X was in
"apparent good health and symptom free." 142
HIV is a per se disability under the DDA.143 The ADF
conceded that it had discriminated against X on the basis of his
disability, but argued that the discrimination was not unlawful
because X could not perform the inherent requirements of his
position, namely "undertake all necessary basic training as a
soldier and thereafter be able to be deployed as required." 144 The
ADF argued that the ability to be "deployed as required" was an
inherent requirement of ADF employment, 145 and that a soldier
with an HIV infection could not be deployed because of the "risk
of injury whereby the soldier may discharge bodily fluid, including
blood, exposing other members of the ADF to risk of
infection." 146 In response, X submitted that the "requirement that
a soldier be HIV free was not an inherent requirement of
employment..." as an ADF soldier. 147 Rather, it was an external
requirement imposed by the ADF, in the absence of which X was
medical procedure was conducted in accordance with an ADF Service Policy designed to
detect, prevent, and manage HIV, which provides: "All regular entrants are to be tested as
soon as possible after arrival at the initial training establishment .... [Plersonnel with
HIV infection are to be discharged." Id. at *4.
141. See Department of Defence Case 1, No. H94\98 sec. 3, para. 6.
142. Department of Defence Case 11, 1996 Aust. Fedct. LEXIS 859 at *4.
143. See DDA, 1992, § 4(c)-(d) (Austl.). For the DDA "disability" definition, see
supra note 9.
144. Department of Defence Case H, 1996 Aust. Fedct. LEXIS 859 at *13.
145. Id. As defined by the DDA, discrimination against an employee on the grounds
of disability, is not unlawful if, considering the current employee's past training,
qualifications and experience, performance as an employee, and all other reasonable
factors, the employee, because of his or her disability:
(a) would be unable to carry out the inherent requirements of the particular
employment; or
(b) would, in order to carry out those requirements, require services or facilities
that are not required by persons without the disability and the provision of
which would impose an unjustifiable hardship on the employer.
DDA § 15(4)(a)-(b) (emphases added).
146. Department of Defence Case M, 1996 Aust. Fedct. LEXIS 859 at *13. In support
of the ADF's deployment-is-an-inherent-requirement-theory, the ADF further submitted
that "HIV-positive soldiers could not give direct emergency blood transfusions in the
field... " as is sometimes required. Id. On the ADF's "very compassionate [HIV and
AIDS] polic[ies]," ADF Spokesman, Brigadier Adrian D'Hage, said that the ADF "would
continue to employ [soldiers] until [they a]re unfit for work..." despite the fact that the
ADF immediate-dismissal-upon-diagnosis-policy dictates a contrary result. Boreham,
supra note 138, at 5.
147. Department of Defence Case 1I, 1996 Aust. Fedct. LEXIS 859 at *13 (emphasis
added); for the DDA "inherent requirement" definition, see supra note 145.
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"completely capable of carrying out all the functional
requirements of the employment as a soldier, including
deployment.'
148
The HREOC construed the DDA's inherent requirement
exemption narrowly, holding that "there must be a clear and
definite relationship between the inherent or intrinsic
characteristics of the employment and the disability in
question. ... "149 The Commission rejected the ADF's suggestion
that "all persons who tested [HIV] positive... could, as a class, be
excluded from employment merely because each person had the
characteristic that he or she had returned a positive test.' 150 As a
result, the HREOC found that the constraints on X's deployability
arose "not because of the physical consequences of the disability..
•, but because of an externally imposed requirement of the [ADF
Policy] . . . ,151 Although deployability was an "incident of
employment," the HREOC held that it was not an "inherent
requirement" of the position, 152 and therefore, the ADF's dismissal
of X was unlawful. 153 The HREOC's conclusion thereby reflects a
heightened sensitivity concerning disability discrimination.
Acting retrogressively, however, an Australian federal court
overturned HREOC's holding in X v. Department of Defence.154
The court found that the case revolved around bleeding safely, "in
the sense that there be no significant risk to others ... of HIV
infection,"'155 and thus remitted the case back to the HREOC for
"further consideration as to the inherent requirements of the
particular employment... "156
The HREOC's decision in X v. Department of Defence
suggests that an employer may not arbitrarily dismiss an employee
because of the employee's medical condition when the condition is
unrelated to the inherent requirements of the employment
148. Department of Defence Case II, 1996 Aust. Fedct. LEXIS 859 at *14.
149. Department of Defence Case I, No. H94\98, sec. 5, para. 15. The HREOC
Commissioner provided the following example: "if the 'inherent requirements' of a job...
required the employee to use both hands, then clearly... [a person with one arm would be
unable] to carry out the inherent requirements of the employment." Id. sec. 5, para. 5.
150. Department of Defence Case 11, 1996 Aust. Fedct. LEXIS 859 at *14.
151. Department of Defence Case I, No. H94\98, sec. 5, para. 7.
152. Id. sec. 5, paras. 15-16.
153. See id. sec. 5, para. 26.
154. See Department of Defence Case III (1998) 152 A.L.R. 182, 218 (Austl.).
155. Id.
156. Id.
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position.157 It logically follows that an "employer could not legally
dismiss an employee for failing to disclose an irrelevant item of
medical history, that is, one which does not relate to the inherent
requirements of the position."'158 Pursuant to O'Callahan-Evans v.
Mitsubishi Motors Australia Ltd.,159 employers may, however,
"dismiss employees who forget to disclose part of their medical
history in their pre-employment questionnaires.. -160 To
exercise this power, an employer need only claim that the
undisclosed medical history relates to the inherent requirements of
the position.
161
When the O'Callahan-Evans plaintiff applied for a job at a
paint shop, she failed to disclose a previous arm injury in a medical
history form and during a pre-employment medical
examination. 162 The employer's doctor testified that, had he been
aware of her medical history, "he would not have recommended
her for employment because ... there was a high likelihood of her
developing carpal tunnel syndrome because of her history."'
163
After commencing her employment duties, which involved
repetitive movement, O'Callahan-Evans experienced discomfort
in her arm and hands. 164 Following a medical examination, the
company's doctors diagnosed her with carpal tunnel syndrome. 165
Although the Industrial Relations Court accepted that
O'Callahan-Evans did not "deliberately mislead" her employer,
the court nevertheless found that the employer possessed a valid
reason for terminating her upon discovering her medical history.166
The court held that "the employer has the right to terminate the
[a]pplicant's employment for reasons which essentially relate to its
operational requirements, and the right to choose employees who
are best suited to the work at hand.' ' 167
157. See Department of Defence Case 1, No. H94\98, sec. 5, para. 15.
158. Joe Catanzariti, Employment Discrimination or Employee Duty?, 34 L. SOc'Y J.
20, 20 (1996).
159. No. 1173 SA (950482) (unreported Indus. Rel. Ct. Sept. 18, 1995) (Austl.)
available at (visited Sept. 21, 1999) <http://www.austlii.edu.au>.
160. Catanzariti, supra note 158, at 20.
161. See generally id.
162. See O'Callahan-Evans, No. 1173 SA, paras. 4-5.
163. Id. para. 13.
164. See id. paras. 7-9.
165. See id. para. 9.
166. Id. paras. 20-22 (emphasis added).
167. Id. para. 24.
[Vol. 22:51
1999] Disability Rights Legislation in the U.S. & Australia 73
Although the DDA supposedly prevents employment
discrimination against individuals with disabilities, it apparently
allows employers the freedom to remove employees with
disabilities from the hiring pool. If the DDA permits employers to
reject job applicants based on subjective beliefs that the
individuals (without accommodations) may not be "best suited,"
the DDA's goal of ensuring that "persons with disabilities have the
same rights to equality" 168 as the rest of the community, will be
unattainable.
2. Attitudinal Obstacles and Implementation Difficulties
Continue to Severely Hinder the DDA's Progress
Problems with implementing the DDA are partially
attributable to Australian attitudes about disability issues.169 By
dealing with disability discrimination in the same way it deals with
sex and race discrimination, 170  the Australian legislature
floundered. To explain, Australia's approach to race and sex
discrimination treats "the factor in question (race, sex, disability,
etc.) ... as irrelevant.' 1 71 This approach may effectively address
race and sex discrimination issues; however, "requiring a ..
person [with a disability] to comply with requirements in the same
way as an able-bodied person does can itself amount to
discrimination." 172 By employing a "comparability requirement,"
the DDA may "exclude people from the protection of the
legislation at the initial stage without allowing them the
opportunity to reach the stage of arguing that the accommodation
required is reasonable .... "173
By comparison, most of the legislation enacted in recent years
takes an approach opposite to the DDA's comparability approach,
and keeps disability legislation "separate from the body of
'ordinary' anti-discrimination law."' 174 The DDA is physically
separate from the rest of Australia's general discrimination
168. DDA, 1992, § 3(b) (Austl.).
169. See generally Tucker, supra note 88.
170. See generally QUINN ET AL., supra note 2, at 130.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 131.
174. Dr. Gerard Quinn, Legislation on Disabled Should be Kept Separate from Anti-
Discrimination Law, IRISH TIMES (Dublin), May 19, 1997, para. 6, available at (visited
Sept. 24, 1999) <http://www.ireland.com/newspaper/ireland/1997/0519/homl8.htm>.
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legislation, yet it utilizes the same approach.17 5 According to Dr.
Gerard Quinn, an authority on anti-discrimination legislation, the
justification for separate legislation is that "although the ultimate
goals (equality) [of race, sex and disability discrimination
legislation] are the same, the means used [to reach those goals]
tend to be quite different.
176
The purpose of disability legislation, says Quinn, "is not to
catch all and sundry[,] but to dismantle barriers actually faced by
people with disabilities." 177 The Australian legislature is unlikely
to level the playing field for individuals with disabilities if its
legislative approach renders the protections impossible to obtain.
3. Meager, Deficient, and Often Non-existent Guidelines for
DDA Compliance and Enforcement
Establishing enforcement regulations and guidelines is of
paramount importance for the successful implementation of any
legislation. The "success or failure of [an act] literally depends on
formulation of adequate standards" 178 that serve not only to
ensure compliance with the statute, but also to alert the public as
to whom the statute applies. 179 Few regulations exist to inform the
Australian public about the DDA's implications, to instruct them
on methods of compliance, or to alert them of the Act's
existence.180 Many people to whom the DDA applies are,
consequently, unaware of the protections to which they are
entitled.181  Moreover, many entities that are required to
175. See generally id. paras. 5-6.
176. Id. para. 8. Further, "[t]he intellectual structure of ordinary anti-discrimination
legislation law makes it ill-suited to accommodate a disability perspective." Id. para. 11.
177. Id. para. 22.
178. Tucker, supra note 88, at 539 (emphasis added).
179. See generally id.
180. The DDA contains no provision mandating the formulation of compliance
regulations. Compare DDA, 1992, § 31(1) (Austl.) (providing that administrative agencies
"may formulate standards, to be known as disability standards ...") (emphasis added)
with 42 U.S.C. § 12134 (1994) (stipulating that "[n]ot later than [one] year after July 26,
1990, the Attorney General shall promulgate regulations in an accessible format that
implement [Title II].") (emphasis added).
181. Indicative of the Australian public's general unawareness of the DDA's
implications is the fact that during the first year following the DDA's enactment, the
HREOC Commissioner received only 220 complaints in all disability discrimination areas.
See Tucker, supra note 88, at 540. In comparison, in the year following the ADA's
enactment, the EEOC received over 16,000 complaints in the employment area alone. See
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accommodate individuals with disabilities are either ignorant of
their obligations, or unsure of what DDA compliance entails.
4. Continued Inaccessibility to Australian Buildings and Services
Because of the DDA's virtual non-enforcement and sparse
implementation regulations, there are significant access problems
in Australia in that, people with disabilities are physically unable
to access buildings and services. Currently, there is "no single
standard for office towers, shopping centers, or industrial facilities
to be deemed disability compliant, and owners, managers, and
councils [remain] unsure of what [is] required.' '182
Changes to the Australian building code, "which would bring
it into line with the [DDA, have been] proposed to improve
disability access."' 183 Unfortunately, because of industry concerns
about costs, a "concerted campaign by property owners
delayed the proposed changes.184 These changes would only apply
to new buildings and major refurbishments of existing buildings. 185
The proposed Australian building code is considerably less
stringent than the ADA design standard, which requires
modification of many existing buildings. 186  Nevertheless,
Australian property owners will not implement a new building
code without a fight. 187
This reluctance to alter Australian public facilities and
buildings (and thereby comply with the DDA) results in continued
inaccessibility for Australians with disabilities. Many Australian
courthouses illustrate these accessibility problems. For example,
182. Lisa Allen, PCA Ire Over Delay on Disabled Standards, AUSTL. FIN. REV.
(Sydney), May 28, 1998, at 45.
183. Plan to Help Disabled Delayed, COURIER-MAIL (Brisbane), May 15, 1998,
available in 1998 WL 9715403.
184. Id.
185. See id.
186. For a discussion on the ADA Title III Accessibility Requirements, see supra text
accompanying notes 64-68.
187. See Australian Building Codes Board: The ABCB Initiative on Access to Buildings
for People with Disabilities, M2 PRESSWIRE, May 4,1998, available in 1998 WL 11309960
(remarking that, on May 4, 1998, six years after the DDA's enactment, the Australian
Buildings Codes Board issued a statement confirming that it would, in the immediate
future, publish a document on building access). But see Paddy Manning, Disabled Access
Law Rewritten, AUSTRALIAN (Sydney), May 7, 1999, at 33 (recognizing that in early May
1999, the Australian Attorney General announced Australia's "intention to amend the
[DDAJ to allow for a mandatory disability standard ... that would replace the existing
complaint-driven enforcement process on access to premises .... ).
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the New South Wales courthouse, wherein DDA matters are
decided, is wheelchair inaccessible.
188
Accessibility obstacles for individuals with disabilities also
plague Australia's tourist attractions. Inaccessible toilets, lack of
signs, and narrow doorways are prevalent at many of Australia's
national landmark buildings. 189  Additionally, entertainment
venues are often inaccessible for individuals with disabilities. In a
recent HREOC decision, a movie theater discriminated against
individuals with disabilities by "making the complex available to
them only... [if] they could use the stairways or be carried up
them." 190 The HREOC held that the discrimination was unlawful
and ordered the theater to install stairlifts within five years. 191
Access to Australia's public services is yet another problem
for individuals with disabilities. An ironic example of Australian
access problems is illustrated in an incident wherein Australia's
Disability Discrimination Commissioner, Elizabeth Hastings, was
late for a press conference because Total Mobility, the taxi service
for people with disabilities, arrived thirty-five minutes late. 192
When Ms. Hastings complained about the delay, Total Mobility
told her that "special taxis were often late."'193 Total Mobility
charged Ms. Hastings twice the normal rate for her taxi ride
because she required a "special taxi.' 194 Upon learning of the
incident, Wellington's Regional Council's Public Transport
Planning Manager stated that "the Council was aware the [taxi]
service might not have enough vehicles... however, there was no
hard evidence that the service was inadequate and [the Council
had not received] much feedback from customers.' 195  The
Planning Manager added that the Council would respond if it
received complaints. 196
188. See Matt Laffan, What the Disability Discrimination Act Means for Solicitors, 33 L.
Soc'Y J. 42, 42 (1995).
189. Kirsten Lawson, Tourist Attractions Rated on Access for the Disabled, CANBERRA
TIMES, Mar. 10, 1998, at A4.
190. Wheelchair 2 Sydney, AUSTRALIAN ASSOCIATED PRESS (AAP) NEWSFEED
(Sydney), Sept. 8, 1997, available in LEXIS, Aust Library, Aapnew File.
191. See id&
192. See Taxi Takes Patience, EVENING POST (Wellington), Nov. 23, 1995, at 12.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Adam Shelton, Taxi Service Might Not Be Adequate, DOMINION (Wellington),
Nov. 23, 1995, at 12.
196. The HREOC received only four complaints about inaccessible transport in 1994.
See Stagecoach Hearing Now Likely in March, DOMINION (Wellington), Nov. 22, 1995, at
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According to Anne Walker, President of the Assembly of
People with Disabilities, however, people with disabilities do not
complain "because they [are] afraid they might lose the
service." 197 This treatment, according to Ms. Hastings, is absurd
because people with disabilities "are as entitled to as much
adequate transport as anybody."'198 This episode occurred three
years after the DDA's passage; only then did the HREOC begin
drafting accessibility standards for public transport. 199
5. Employment: the DDA Prevents Employment Discrimination
Solely in Hiring and Firing Decisions
Examination of the DDA's application in the employment
context reveals another of the Act's inherent flaws. The DDA's
employment provisions provide that "an employer need only make
reasonable accommodations of an employee's disability when
making decisions to hire or fire the employee." 200 The Act does
not, however, specifically require that an employer reasonably
accommodate an employee's disability throughout his or her
employment. 201 Therefore, after the initial hiring decision is
made, the "Act does not require an employer to reasonably
accommodate a current employee's disability when making a
decision about such matters as training or promotion."
20 2
A statute prohibiting any and all employment discrimination
on the basis of disability, regardless of the nature of the decision or
circumstance giving rise thereto, would clearly better serve
Australians with disabilities. 20 3 A recent HREOC decision, Garity
v. Commonwealth Bank of Australia,2°4 which awarded damages
27. In each case, the Commission ruled that the operators acted illegally. See id.
197. Shelton, supra note 195, at 12.
198. Id.
199. If enacted, operators have 15 to 20 years to implement the standards; see Taxi
Takes Patience, supra note 192, at 12.
200. Bourke, supra note 83, at 327 (emphasis added) (interpreting DDA, 1992, § 15(4)
(Austl.)). "The Act does not state who is to determine the reasonableness of the
accommodation .... " Id. at 327.
201. See id.
202. Id.
203. See generally id.
204. No. H97/191 (unreported HREOC Jan. 25, 1999) (Austl.) available at (visited
Sept. 23, 1999) <http://www.hreoc.gov.au/cgi-bin/programs/view.cgi>. See also Kylie
Skipper, $153,500-and the Bank Says Sorry, MERCURY (Hobart), Feb. 6, 1999, at 1. The
HREOC ordered the Commonwealth Bank to pay Mrs. Garity, a bank employee with
visual impairments and insulin-dependent diabetes, $153,500.00 in damages for
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to a bank employee with visual impairments for the bank's failure
to provide her with training and career advancement
opportunities, 20 5 however, indicates that the effects of this
legislative oversight may be minimal.
Although the HREOC decisions are often inconsistent, they
reflect the Australian Commonwealth's earnest efforts to
eliminate disability discrimination. These decisions illustrate the
DDA's shortcomings and weaknesses, and demonstrate that the
DDA must undergo substantial modification before the
Commonwealth brings its goal of eliminating disability
discrimination to fruition.
C. The ADA's Strengths
1. The ADA's Unique Legislative Approach to Disability Issues
The United States' approach to disability discrimination
issues, which is distinguishable from its approach to all other
discrimination issues, is one of the ADA's strengths.20 6 The
ADA's drafters recognized that disability issues must be dealt with
in a different manner than all other discrimination issues. Many
"discriminated groups are not objectively 'different' ... [in that]
... what they require most of all is legislation prohibiting public
discrimination. See Garity, No. H97/191 sec. 3.1, paras. 3,5; sec. 8.3.3, para. 11.
205. See generally Garity, No. H97/191 sec. 7.1. On February 5, 1999, the bank publicly
apologized for "breaches" of the DDA. See Skipper, supra note 204, at 1. Although the
bank "had an equal opportunity policy of employing people with disabilities, [the bank]
had failed to implement the policy in any effective way." Id. See also Aust's CBA Pays
Employee $153,000 for Discrimination Breach, AUSTRALIAN ASSOCIATED PRESS (AAP)
NEWSFEED (Sydney), Feb. 5, 1999, available in LEXIS, Aust Library, Aapnew File
(according to the bank's human resources representative, when "Mrs. Garity was first
employed .... the bank's management 'like the rest of the community, understood much
less about the needs of disabled employees than [they] do now."'). The bank failed to
provide Garity with training and advancement opportunities in that, among other things,
she did not receive "circulars or memos and did not get to attend regular staff meetings."
Skipper, supra note 204, at 1. See also Garity, H97/191 sec. 3.1, para. 7. The stress from
her work at the bank worsened her diabetes, which later caused further damage to her
eyesight. See id. sec. 3.1, paras. 22-24. Furthermore, Garity, who was a telephone
operator, did not receive "specific instructions as to what to do in an emergency." Id. sec.
3.1, para. 30. Later, Garity's supervisor instructed her to remain at her desk during fire
drills "to deal with telephone calls." Id. The Commission held that the bank had denied
Garity "the same employment opportunities to training, promotion and retraining ..."
that it would have provided for an employee without a disability. Skipper, supra note 204,
at 1.
206. See generally Quinn, supra note 174, para. 6.
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and private actors from treating them as though they were
different. ' 20 7 In contrast to other discriminated groups, "people
with disabilities are ... different. '20 8 Therefore, legislation that
protects the disability community logically must utilize a different
approach than the approach that general discrimination legislation
employs.
2. Exacting Enforcement and Clear, Effective ADA Compliance
Regulations and Guidelines
As a result of the multitude of ADA regulations and
guidelines, the U.S. Government's relatively strict enforcement,
and the public's general awareness, the ADA has made substantial
strides to combat disability discrimination. The ADA achieved
particular success in implementing guidelines mandating access to
services and facilities. Much of this success is attributable to the
compliance regulations set forth shortly after the Act's passage
and the fact that the Act required compliance from most entities
within five years.2 9 By employing a regulation-based method, as
opposed to a complaint-based one, the ADA alleviated many
barriers for Americans with disabilities.
210
D. The ADA's Weaknesses
The United States' experience with disability discrimination
spans several decades and its progress towards eliminating
disability discrimination is unparalleled. Despite this extensive
background and unequalled progress, legislative design flaws
preclude the Act from fully achieving its ultimate goal.
The ADA's disability definition is the Act's most significant
deficiency. Judicial decisions and ADA statutory interpretations
illustrate the shortcomings of the Act's defining language.21'
207. Id. (emphases added).
208. Id. (emphasis added) (explaining that disability discrimination differs from other
types of discrimination because physical characteristics distinguish individuals who have
disabilities from those who do not; therefore, effectively legislating equal treatment for
individuals with disabilities involves addressing this distinction).
209. See, e.g., 28 C.F.R. § 36.508 (1998); 28 C.F.R. § 35.151(c); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(e)
(1998).
210. But see generally Longmore, supra note 44, at 85 (recognizing that the ADA has
"not been as effective as originally hoped .... ).
211. See infra Parts IV.D.1-4 (enumerating some of the ADA's shortcomings).
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1. Failing to Reasonably Accommodate Individuals with
Perceived Disabilities: an ADA Interpretation Oversight
The provision in the ADA's disability definition referring to
an individual who is "regarded as" having a disability is often
overlooked. 212 The ADA requires an employer to reasonably
accommodate "the known physical or mental impairments of an
otherwise qualified individual with a disability."213 In addition, the
disability definition "extends to persons who are erroneously
perceived . . . " as having a disability, as long as they can perform
the essential functions of the job.214 It rationally follows that
individuals who are erroneously perceived as having a disability
are among those who should be entitled to ADA reasonable
accommodations from their employers. 215 Nevertheless, in Deane
v. Pocono Medical Center,216 the court rejected the notion that
people with perceived disabilities are entitled to ADA
accommodations. 217 The plaintiff in Deane was a nurse who, after
recovering from a wrist injury incurred at work, informed her
hospital employer that she was able to return to work. 218 Because
of her limited lifting capabilities, Deane requested a "light duty"
position.219  In response to Deane's request, the hospital
concluded that it could not accommodate her medical limitations,
and shortly thereafter terminated her employment.
220
Deane claimed she was protected under the ADA because
the hospital "regarded her limitations as being far worse than they
actually were, that [the hospital] failed to accommodate her lifting
212. For the ADA "regarded as having an impairment" provision, see supra note 28.
This Comment uses the phrases "perceived as" and "regarded as" interchangeably.
213. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (1994).
214. Michael D. Moberly, Letting the Katz Out of the Bag: the Employer's Duty to
Accommodate Perceived Disabilities, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 603, 634.
215. See id.
216. 10 Nat'l Disability L. Rep. (BNA) 1 280, at 1003 (3d Cir. Aug. 25, 1997), vacated,
reh'g granted, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 27243 (3d Cir. Oct. 3, 1997); rev'd and remanded, 142
F.3d 138 (3d Cir. 1998).
217. See Moberly, supra note 214, at 616-617.
218. See id. at 617.
219. Deane, 142 F.3d at 141; see also Moberly, supra note 214, at 618 n.104
("Reasonable accommodation ... does not require that an employer create a light-duty
position .... But if an employer has a vacant light-duty position.., for which the
employee [with a disability] is qualified, it would be a reasonable accommodation to
reassign the employee to that position." (citation omitted)).
220. See Deane, 142 F.3d at 141.
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restriction, and that she was eventually terminated on account of
[the hospital]'s erroneous perception that she [had a disability].
221
The Deane court rationalized that, in the context of an individual
who does not actually have a disability, but is merely regarded as
having a disability:
the employer need only be dispossessed of its misperception as
it is that which renders the employee disabled. Thereafter, the
individual would be neither actually nor statutorily disabled
and, like any non-disabled individual would not be able to
invoke the accommodations provisions of the ADA for any
non-disabling impairments -including the impairment that
initially might have given rise to the employer's perception of a
disability. Accommodation, therefore, would play no role in
leveling the playing field.
222
Thus, the court held that individuals who do not "actually" have
disabilities but are only perceived as such "are not entitled to
accommodation." 223 One of the court's puzzling justifications for
rejecting Deane's perceived disability claim was its conclusion that
the employer's perception of Deane's impairment was not
"motivated by 'myth, fear or stereotype,' and therefore was not
actionable under the ADA.
'224
On appeal, the court remanded the Deane case on a different
issue.225  Although failing to address the matter directly, the
appeals court impliedly affirmed the lower court's conclusion that
reasonable accommodation would "not [be] required because
[Deane was] a 'regarded as' plaintiff. '226 The Deane decision not
only discounted the importance of the ADA's "perceived as"
provision, it also ignored the fact that the employee's coworkers
and the employer's customers often have misperceptions about an
employee's disability.227 In those instances, "an accommodation
221. Deane, 10 Nat'l Disability L. Rep. at 1004 (emphasis added).
222. Id. at 1008 (footnote omitted).
223. Id. at 1009; see also Moberly, supra note 214, at 622 n.146 (acknowledging that the
"dicta in the now-vacated Deane opinion ... constitutes generally accepted principles of
law under the ADA." (citation omitted)).
224. Deane, 142 F.3d at 144.
225. See id. at 148 n.12. The court focused on whether Deane was a "qualified
individual" and did not directly address whether or not employers must accommodate a
"regarded as" employee when the employee cannot perform the essential functions of the
employment position. See id.
226. Id. at 149.
227. See Moberly, supra note 214, at 621. But see Katz v. City Metal Co., 87 F.3d 26, 32
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beyond simply correcting the employer's own misperceptions may
be necessary to level the playing field and enable the employee
who is erroneously perceived [as having a disability] to compete
with other employees.
'" 228
2. By Requiring "Substantial Limitation" of a Major Life Activity,
the ADA Substantially Limits Proper Distribution of its
Protections
The ADA's "substantial limitation" requirement is another
fundamental flaw in the Act's definition of disability. Although an
individual may undoubtedly qualify as having a disability, if the
disability does not substantially limit a major life activity, the
individual is not entitled to ADA protection.
229
Circumstances involving asymptomatic diseases, such as
certain stages of HIV, are illustrative of this flaw in the ADA's
disability definition. For example, at first glance, "classifying [an
asymptomatic disease such as] HIV as a 'disability' - a physical or
mental impairment that substantially limits a major life activity-
seems simple." 230  According to ADA Title I regulations, a
"'physical impairment' includes '[a]ny physiological disorder'
affecting the 'hemic and lymphatic' systems." 231  Thus, because
"the HIV virus attacks the hemic and lymphatic systems as soon as
it enters the body . . .the HIV infection clearly fits within the
regulatory definition of impairment. '232 This language could also
apply to other asymptomatic diseases. Unfortunately, because
asymptomatic diseases often do not "substantially limit a major life
activity," they frequently are not deemed qualified disabilities.
(1st Cir. 1996) (holding that an individual with an impairment that is not substantially
limiting can be considered as having a disability if the individual is perceived as having a
disability that is substantially limiting).
228. Moberly, supra note 214, at 621 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). In a
situation where the employment barrier arises "from the prejudicial attitudes of an
individual's co-workers, . . .mandatory sensitivity training may succeed in educating
employees [about] appropriate means of dealing with persons with impairments." Id. at
638.
229. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (1994) (containing the ADA's "substantial
limitation" language) with the HREOC's reasons for rejecting it; supra Part IV.A.1
(discussing the HREOC's reasons for rejecting the ADA's "substantially limits"
language).
230. Cameron & Wagner, supra note 28, at 5.
231. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (1998).
232. Runnebaum v. NationsBank, 123 F.3d 156, 183 (4th Cir. 1997) (Michael, J.,
dissenting).
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Title I regulations stipulate that HIV infection is an
"inherently substantially limiting" disability.233 Accordingly, in
Bragdon v. Abbott,234 the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that HIV
is a disability,235 even when the infection has not yet progressed to
the "so-called []symptomatic phase, . . ." because the virus attacks
the immune system, and because it substantially limits the life
activity of reproduction. 236  The Court reasoned that HIV
substantially limited the ability to reproduce because of the risk of
transmission to a sexual partner or to a child "during gestation and
childbirth. ,,237
On "closer inspection, characterizing HIV as a disability is not
so easy." 238 In view of its determination that HIV is a substantially
limiting impairment, the Bragdon Court did not address whether
HIV infection is a "per se disability under the ADA. ' 239 Although
the nature of HIV and its corresponding relationship to AIDS was
well documented when the ADA was enacted in 1990, Congress
did not, at that time, immediately mandate that HIV could be
characterized as a disability for purposes of the ADA.240 The U.S.
Supreme Court in Bragdon, however, mitigated Congress'
oversight. The Bragdon decision only applies to AIDS and HIV,
and thus does not repair the ADA's disheartening omission of
many other asymptomatic diseases, such as some stages of cancer
and carpal tunnel syndrome, diabetes, hypertension, or hepatitis
C.241  The Bragdon Court "neither addressed nor resolved"
whether asymptomatic diseases other than HIV and AIDS would
be deemed qualified disabilities under the ADA.242
Pre-Bragdon decisions reasoned that asymptomatic HIV did
not qualify as an ADA disability because "without symptoms,
233. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.20) (1998).
234. 118 S. Ct. 2196,2196 (1998).
235. See id. But see id. at 2215 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting) (arguing that reproduction
is "not necessarily a major life activity...").
236. Id. at 2209.
237. Id. at 2206.
238. Cameron & Wagner, supra note 28, at 6.
239. Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2207.
240. See Cameron & Wagner, supra note 28, at 6.
241. See id. at 3 (footnotes omitted).
242. Id. The U.S. Supreme Court's conclusion in Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc.,
strongly suggests that asymptomatic diseases other than HIV and AIDS will not be
deemed disabilities under the ADA. See 119 S. Ct. 2139, 2147 (1999) (remarking that
without symptoms, an asymptomatic disease would likely not be considered an
impairment that "presently 'substantially limits' a major life activity.").
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there are no diminishing effects on the individual.,, 243 Some courts
accept the notion that HIV does not affect a major life activity
because:
although 'procreation is a fundamental human activity, [it is]
not certain that it is one of the major life activities contemplated
by the ADA;' and in any event, HIV is not substantially
limiting, because it is 'the conscience or normative judgment of
the particular infected person,' not the impairment, that
substantially limits procreation.
244
Despite these arguments, asymptomatic HIV and AIDS now
qualify for ADA protection while other asymptomatic diseases
still may not. The sweeping disqualification of individuals with
asymptomatic diseases from ADA protection directly contradicts
the Act's underlying policy that "society's accumulated myths and
fears about disabilit[ies] and disease[s] are as handicapping as are
the physical limitations that flow from [the] actual
impairment[s]. ' ' 245 Proper implementation of this policy leads to
the conclusion that disabilities, even those that may be
asymptomatic, should receive ADA protection.
The decision in Madjlessi v. Macy's West, Inc.246 further
evinces that neither the "substantially limits" language nor the
"regarded as" protections are sufficient to protect people with
asymptomatic disabilities from discrimination. Madjlessi was an
employee of Macy's West Department Store (Macy's). 247 After
she was diagnosed with breast cancer, Madjlessi continued to work
for Macy's during her chemotherapy treatments, taking a few days
off work each month to recover from the treatment's side
effects.248 Despite favorable employment ratings, after several
departmental transfers and at least one demotion, Macy's
terminated Madjlessi's employment. 249 Madjlessi alleged that she
243. Runnebaum v. NationsBank, 123 F.3d 156, 168 (4th Cir. 1997).
244. Cameron & Wagner, supra note 28, at 6 & 10 nn.64-65 (footnotes omitted)
(quoting Runnebaum, 123 F.3d at 170-171). The court also noted that "[e]xtending the
coverage of the ADA to asymptomatic conditions ... would run counter to Congress'[]
intention as expressed in the plain statutory language." Runnebaum, 123 F.3d at 168.
245. School Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273,284 (1987) (footnote omitted).
246. 993 F. Supp. 736 (N.D. Cal. 1997).
247. See id. at 737.
248. See id. at 738.
249. See id.
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was discriminated against on the basis of her breast cancer, that
she had an ADA qualified disability, and thus that her termination
was unlawful.
250
In rejecting Madjlessi's claim that she was "'substantially
limited' in one or more of her 'major life activities,' 251 the court
noted that although Madjlessi "worked while suffering the side
effects of vomiting, weakness and nausea, this alone [did] not
satisfy the 'substantial[ly] limits' standard. ' 252 The court also
rejected Madjlessi's argument that the documentation of her
cancer diagnosis and records of her chemotherapy treatments
qualified her as having a disability under the "history of a
disability" prong of the ADA's "disability" definition.253 As a
final alternative, Madjlessi offered that her breast cancer was a
qualified disability because other employees thought that her
cancer substantially limited her ability to work. 254 According to
the court, the ADA's "reference to a substantial limitation
indicates that an employer regards an employee as [substantially
limited] in his or her ability to work by finding the employee's
impairment to foreclose generally the type of employment
involved. 255  Thus, because Macy's continued to employ
Madjlessi after the onset of her impairment, the court concluded
that Madjlessi could not support a claim that Macy's regarded her
as "substantially limited. ' 256 Because Madjlessi failed to establish
that she had a substantially limiting qualified disability, the court
dismissed her complaint.
257
"Failing to make reasonable accommodations is ... one type
of discrimination that the ADA is intended to deter."258  The
ADA's policy and intent support the notion of protecting
250. See id. at 738-740.
251. Id. at 740.
252. Id. at 741.
253. See id. at 741-742. See also generally 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A)-(C) (1994). For the
ADA "disability" definition, see supra note 10.
254. See Madjlessi, 993 F. Supp. at 742.
255. Id. (citation omitted). Accord Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2139,
2151 (1999) (holding that when "the major life activity under consideration is that of
working, the statutory phrase 'substantially limits' requires, at a minimum, that plaintiffs
allege they are unable to work in a broad class of jobs."). "The inability to perform a
single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of
working." Id.
256. Madjlessi, 993 F. Supp. at 742.
257. See id. at 736.
258. Moberly, supra note 214, at 640.
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individuals with perceived disabilities; punishing those who
discriminate based on the erroneous perception that an individual
has a disability "deters discrimination against those who actually
have disabilities.
'" 259
Until recently, some federal courts accepted the notion that
an individual with an impairment that is not substantially limiting
(or with no impairment at all) is nevertheless an ADA qualified
individual if the individual is treated "as having an impairment
that does substantially limit [his or her] major life activities."
260
This interpretation, however, was never adopted as the universal
standard, and was subsequently rejected by the U.S. Supreme
Court in Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc.261 In Sutton, the Court held
that, in order to demonstrate a disability, the ADA's language
requires a person have a present substantial limitation.
262
3. Abandoning the ADA Statutory Entitlements of Individuals
with Controlled Impairments
A "controlled impairment" is "one that would substantially
limit a major life activity if untreated, but that does not limit any
such activity when treated with some mitigating measure."
263
According to one of the EEOC's ADA interpretive guidelines, the
"existence of an impairment is to be determined without regard to
mitigating measures such as medicines, or assistive or prosthetic
devices." 264  Pursuant to this guideline, referred to as the "no
mitigating measure guideline," 265 individuals with controlled
impairments have ADA disabilities "even if they do not
experience [or have never experienced] a substantial limitation in
any major life activity." 266 Thus, the EEOC deemed it necessary
259. Id. at 620 (emphasis added).
260. Katz v. City Metal Co., 87 F.3d 26, 32 (1st Cir. 1996). But see Moberly, supra note
214, at 628 (discussing that some courts subscribe to the notion that "the duty to make a
reasonable accommodation arises only when the individual [has a disability]; no such duty
arises when the individual merely is 'regarded as' [having a disability] .... " (citation and
footnote omitted)).
261. 119 S. Ct. 2139 (1999).
262. See id. at 2141.
263. Erica Worth Harris, Controlled Impairments Under the Americans with
Disabilities Act: A Search for the Meaning of Disability, 73 WASH. L. REV. 575,580 (1998).
264. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(h) (1998) (EEOC regulations); see also 28 C.F.R.
pt. 35 app. A § 35.104 (1998) (DOJ regulations).
265. Harris, supra note 263, at 579-580.
266. Id. at 580.
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to determine the existence of an impairment without regard to
mitigating measures.
267
Although eight of the nine federal courts of appeal addressing
the controlled impairments issue adopted the EEOC guideline, 268
lower courts were undecided as to whether the "no mitigating
measures guideline" was a binding legislative rule or merely an
interpretive rule 269 until the 1999 U.S. Supreme Court decision in
Sutton. The stipulation that a major life activity be impaired often
renders it impossible to determine the existence of an impairment
without regard to mitigating measures. If an individual's
impairment is temporary, occurs sporadically or seasonally, or is
effectively masked by medication at the time the disability
determination is made, then no life activity is impaired; thus the
individual may not receive ADA protection.
Critics of the "no mitigating measures guideline" contend that
individuals with controlled impairments are not worthy of
inclusion in the ADA's protected classes because the individuals
are not substantially limited in one or more major life activity.270
It is difficult to believe, however, that "Congress wished to provide
protection to workers who leave it to their employer to
accommodate their impairments but to deny protection to workers
who act independently to overcome their disabilities. ' 271 Ignoring
267. The EEOC is one of the entities charged with promulgating regulations for
compliance with the ADA. See 42 U.S.C. § 12116 (1994). No agency, however, "has been
given authority to issue regulations implementing the generally applicable provisions of
the ADA .... Most notably, no agency has been delegated authority to interpret the term
'disability.' . . . The EEOC has, nonetheless, issued regulations to provide additional
guidance regarding the proper interpretation of this term." Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc.,
119 S. Ct. 2139, 2145 (1999).
268. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2153 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The U.S. Supreme Court
did not make a determination on the issue until the 1999 Sutton case. See generally id.
269. See Harris, supra note 263, at 602. The consequence of declining to follow the
guideline is that the "net result [of the disability determination] is that a mere medical
diagnosis of a disability is not enough. The disability in question must also lead to the
substantial impairment of a major life activity." QUINN ET AL., supra note 2, at 51. See
Lisa Eichhorn, Major Litigation Activities Regarding Major Life Activities: The Failure of
the "Disability" Definition in the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 77 N.C. L. REV.
1405, 1457 (1999) (explaining that the disability determination thereby often creates "a
catch-22 for plaintiffs. In order to prevail, plaintiffs must prove not only a substantial
limitation but also must prove that they are qualified for the job opportunities or services
that defendants have denied them." (footnote omitted)).
270. See Harris, supra note 263, at 607 (arguing that "It]he term 'disability' can be
continuously manipulated and expanded until it loses any coherent meaning or practical
limit.").
271. Isaac S. Greaney, Note, The Practical Impossibility of Considering the Effect of
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. [Vol. 22:51
this reality, and this EEOC guideline, effectively robs individuals
with controlled impairments of protections to which they should
be statutorily entitled.
272
The U.S. Supreme Court addressed the EEOC guideline's
validity in Sutton and determined that the guideline was "an
impermissible interpretation of the ADA. '273 In Sutton, United
Airlines denied applicants with visual impairments (myopia)
employment positions as global airline pilots because the
applicants failed to meet the airline's minimum uncorrected visual
acuity requirement.274 The Court held that the applicants were
not ADA "qualified individuals" because, by virtue of the fact that
their impairments were corrected with mitigating measures, they
were not "presently" substantially limited. 275  The Court
interpreted the ADA's disability definition "as requiring that a
person be presently-not potentially or hypothetically-
substantially limited in order to demonstrate a disability."
276
Accordingly, the Court made the disability determination "with
reference to corrective measures"277 and held that the applicants
were unable to establish "that they were substantially limited in
Mitigating Measures under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990,26 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 1267, 1291 (1999) (footnote omitted). "For example, the ADA would not protect a
claimant who regularly takes prozac, but would protect a similarly situated claimant who,
rather than take medication, demanded accommodations from his employer." Id at 1291-
1292 (footnote omitted).
272. But see Harris, supra note 263, at 603-604 (arguing that "substantially limits" does
not include an impairment that may substantially limit a major life activity; the EEOC
guideline changes the meaning of "substantially limits" to "would, could or might
substantially limit."); Michael J. Puma, Note, Respecting the Plain Language of the ADA:
A Textualist Argument for Rejecting the EEOC's Analysis of Controlled Disabilities, 67
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 123, 142 (1998) (noting that the "textualist method of statutory
interpretation," which compels courts "to seek the meaning of a statute in its text first and
to resort to agency interpretations and legislative history only when the plain meaning of
the text is unclear[,]" supports rejection of the EEOC guideline).
273. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2141.
274. See id. The United Airlines visual acuity requirement stipulated that all United
Airlines global pilots have "uncorrected visual acuity of 20/100 or better .... " Id The
applicants in Sutton each "ha[d] uncorrected visual acuity of 20/200 or worse, but with
corrective measures, both function[ed] identically to individuals without similar
impairments." Id.
275. Id. at 2146-2147.
276. Id. at 2146. The Court also noted that "[t]o be sure, a person whose physical or
mental impairment is corrected by mitigating measures still has an impairment, but if the
impairment is corrected it does not 'substantially limi[t]' a major life activity." Id. at 2147.
277. Id. at 2149,
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any major life activity."
278
In Sutton, the U.S. Supreme Court, with its "miserly"
279
construction of the ADA, concluded that "Congress did not intend
to bring under the statute's protection all those whose corrected
conditions amount to disabilities." 280  Congressional findings
estimated that there were approximately forty-three million
Americans with disabilities when the ADA was enacted.281 The
Court compared these findings to other estimates and census data,
most of which estimated a much higher number of Americans with
disabilities.282 The Court then concluded that:
Had Congress intended to include all persons with corrected
physical limitations among those covered by the Act, it would
undoubtedly have cited to a much higher number of disabled
persons in the [ADA's] findings. That it did not is evidence
that the ADA's coverage is restricted to only those whose
impairments are not mitigated by corrective measures.
283
The ADA's legislative history makes it "abundantly clear that
Congress intended the ADA to cover individuals who could
perform all of their major life activities only with the help of
ameliorative measures." 284  Nevertheless, the Court used
Congress' "legislative myopia," 285 in failing to accurately foresee
the number of Americans with disabilities, to further constrict the
ADA's application.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 2152 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that, "in order to be faithful to the
remedial purpose of the Act, [the Court] should give it a generous, rather than a miserly,
construction.").
280. Id. at 2147.
281. See id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1) (1994).
282. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2148 (referring to a 1988 report by the National Council
on Disability, which estimated that the number ranged from an "overinclusive 160 million
... to an underinclusive 22.7 million..
283. Id. at 2149.
284. Id. at 2154 (Stevens, J., dissenting). As evidence of Congress' intent, Justice
Stevens cited a Senate Report, stating that "whether a person has a disability should be
assessed without regard to the availability of mitigating measures, such as reasonable
accommodations or auxiliary aids..." and a House Committee on the Judiciary Report
reiterating the same sentiment. Id. at 2154-2155 (referring to S. REP. No. 101-116, at 23
(1989); H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 3, at 28 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303,
450).
285. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2152 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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4. The ADA's Neglected Cosmetic Disfigurement Provision
The very mention of "cosmetic disfigurements" 28 6 in the
ADA's "physical or mental impairment" definition 287 implies that
individuals with physically disfiguring impairments qualify for
ADA protection. This conclusion is supported by the Act's
underlying policies, especially the notion that society's fears and
stereotypes often represent more of a barrier to individuals with
disabilities than are the actual disabilities.288 Courts, however, are
reluctant to recognize physical disfigurements as ADA
disabilities.
289
In Johnson v. Dunhill Temporary Systems, Inc.,290 Johnson
contended that he was fired from his telemarketing job because of
his physical disfigurement, namely that he was missing eighteen
teeth.291 Johnson claimed that because his disfigurement was a
disability under the ADA, his employer's failure to provide him
with a reasonable accommodation was unlawful. 292 In response,
Johnson's employer claimed that Johnson was dismissed because
he mumbled on the telephone. 293
To qualify as an "individual with a disability" under the
ADA, an individual's disability must substantially limit one or
more major life activities.294 The Johnson court acknowledged
that "speaking and working qualify as major life activities." 295
Nevertheless, because Johnson did "not allege that he [spoke] in a
manner which restrict[ed] him or his ability to work[,]" 296 rather,
he alleged that his employers' "misperception of his ability to
speak ha[d] caused them to significantly restrict his ability to
286. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1) (1998).
287. See id. § 1630.2(h)(1)-(2). For the ADA "physical impairment" definition, see
supra note 24.
288. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (1994).
289. See, e.g., Van Sickle v. Automatic Data Processing, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1213, 1223
(E.D. Mich. 1997) (holding that an employer's comments on an employee's six-inch long
facial scar, including "scar-face," were insufficient to establish disability discrimination).
290. 11 Nat'l Disability L. Rep. (BNA) 78, at 320 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 24, 1997); reh'g
denied, 151 F.3d 1033 (7th Cir. 1998).
291. See Johnson, 11 Nat'l Disability L. Rep. (BNA) at 320.
292. See id
293. See id.
294. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (1994). For the ADA "major life activity" definition, see
supra note 26.
295. Johnson, 11 Nat'l Disability L. Rep. (BNA) at 321.
296. Id.
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work," the court held that Johnson was not an ADA qualified
individual with a disability.2
97
The Johnson court noted that the "significant restriction of a
major life activity screens [out] trivial claims[,]" which is how the
court categorized Johnson's cosmetic disfigurement claim.298
Although the strength of Johnson's claim is debatable, the holding
in Madjlessi299 strongly suggests that the application of the major
life activity restriction may screen out meritous claims as well.
E. The ADA and the DDA: A Comparison
It is estimated that one in five Americans has some type of
disability. 30 0 Individuals with disabilities are the single largest
minority group in the United States, comprising roughly twenty
percent of the population.30 1 In Australia, individuals who identify
themselves as having disabilities constitute eighteen percent of the
population. 30 2 As the number of individuals with disabilities
continues to grow, it becomes increasingly evident that the rights
of the disability community require effective protection. To
ensure such protection, the legislative weaknesses in the ADA and
the DDA must be directly remedied.
1. Australia's Continued Access Problems
Although the DDA may or may not require public entities to
consistently accommodate individuals with disabilities, it clearly
does not prohibit these entities from charging additional fees for
"special" services.30 3  In contrast, not only does the ADA
categorically require that covered entities accommodate the access
needs of the disability community, it also prohibits these entities
from charging additional fees for accommodated services.304
297. Id.
298. Id. (stating that Johnson's claim was, in fact, "one such trivial claim.").
299. Madjlessi v. Macy's West, Inc., 993 F. Supp. 736 (N.D. Cal. 1997).
300. See Barbara A. Petrus & J. Denice von Gnechten, A Primer on the Americans
with Disabilities Act, HAW. Bj., June 1998, at 6, 6 & n.1 (1998), available in Westlaw, 2-
Jun Haw. BJ. 6.
301. See id. (stating that these numbers are likely to increase as the population ages).
302. See Laffan, supra note 188, at 42.
303. See, e.g., discussion supra Part IV.B.4.
304. See 28 C.F.R. § 36.301(c) (1998) (stipulating that a public accommodation may not
impose a surcharge on an individual with a disability to cover the costs of accommodations
that are necessary to provide that individual with the nondiscriminatory treatment
required by the ADA). See also 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(f) (1998).
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2. The Superiority of the United States' Disability Legislation
Framework
Critics of the DDA complain that the Commonwealth used
"[t]oo little imagination" 30 5 in drafting the Act. Specifically, critics
allege that the DDA "remained within the traditional Australian
anti-discrimination law design instead of adopting a new model
more appropriate for people with disabilities." 30 6 Although one
option available to the DDA's drafters was the ADA's
"regulation-based" approach, the Australian Commonwealth
ultimately utilized a "complaint-based method" for the DDA's
framework. 30 7 The complaint-based approach is less effective than
the ADA's approach because it "does not require disability
standards be... promulgated with respect to access to premises or
goods, services, and facilities."
30 8
Furthermore, as Quinn suggests, 30 9 it is problematic to apply
traditional, generic anti-discrimination framework, which relies on
a basic test of comparability, to the unique problem of disability
discrimination. 310 When there are real differences between the
persons compared, as with disability issues, the "comparison will
be impossible." 311  In drafting the DDA, the Australian
Commonwealth declined to follow the ADA's approach that
legislates "a right to fair treatment, ' 312 and thus avoids "the need
to make comparisons with others."313 In its place, Australia
adopted a "victim-based approach," because the DDA's drafters
felt that it would be "too radical to change the whole
[discrimination legislation] paradigm to deal with the issue of
disability. "314
305. Tyler, supra note 78, at 224.
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. Tucker, supra note 12, at 17.
309. For the Quinn discussion, see supra text accompanying notes 170-177.
310. See generally supra text accompanying notes 174-176.
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3. Dealing Effectively with Cosmetic Disfigurements
Both the DDA and the ADA include provisions to protect
individuals with cosmetic disfigurements from discrimination.
315
Under the ADA, these impairments should qualify as disabilities
under either the definition of disability itself, or under the
"perceived as" provision. Unfortunately, the "substantially limits"
requirement precludes these applications.
316
Presently, there are no published judicial interpretations of
the DDA's disfigurement provision. Because the DDA does not
contain the ADA's "substantially limits" language, however, it is
possible that, unlike U.S. courts, Australian courts will interpret
the provision in accordance with the drafters' intent.
4. Expanding the ADA's Disability Definition
Clearly the ADA's weakest element is its definition of
disability.317 The flaws in this definition are reflected in the
restrictive "substantially limits" requirement, the neglected
cosmetic disfigurement and "perceived as" disabilities provisions,
and the courts' refusal to extend ADA protection to individuals
with controlled impairments.
In drafting the DDA, the HREOC expressly rejected the
ADA's "substantially limits" language. 318  According to the
HREOC, the "requirement that a person's impairment
substantially limit[] major life activities is a source of unnecessary
legal difficulties or complexities." 319 In particular, the HREOC
viewed the ADA's disability definition as "posing difficulties for
people whose condition has disabling effects only intermittently
rather than continuously or whose condition is controlled by
medication and/or other treatments. ' 320 In rejecting this language,
the HREOC may have eluded the problems that will ensue in the
315. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1) (1998); for the
ADA provisions, see supra notes 10, 24. See also DDA, 1992, § 4(e) (Austl.); for the
DDA provision, see supra note 9.
316. See supra Part IV.D.2 (discussing the effects of the ADA's "substantially limits"
requirement).
317. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A)-(C). For the ADA "disability" definition, see supra
note 10.
318. See QUINN ET AL., supra note 2, at 128.
319. Id.
320. Id.
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
United States as a result of the Sutton decision. 321
5. Perfecting the DDA and ADA Employment Provisions
Although the ADA's disability definition is inferior to the
DDA's, many of the protections the ADA provides in the
employment arena are superior. Thus, although the DDA's broad
definition includes deserving individuals excluded by the ADA,
the protections the DDA provides for these individuals are often
inconsequential. For example, in the context of employment, the
ADA prohibits disability discrimination in "application
procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees,
employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions,
and privileges of employment. ' '322 In barring discrimination, the
ADA requires that reasonable accommodations be made for
qualified individuals in all of the aforementioned areas. 323
Conversely, although the DDA purportedly bars all
employment discrimination, the DDA only requires an employer
to reasonably accommodate an employee's disability when making
decisions "about whether to refuse to hire or to fire the
employee." 324 The DDA imposes no obligation on employers to
accommodate "a current employee's disability when making a
decision about such matters as training or promotion." 325 This
distinction reflects the differences between the approaches utilized
in the DDA and the ADA. Both laws claim to bar all
discrimination on the basis of disability, but fail to achieve this
objective in specific respects. Part of the DDA's failure to
eliminate employment discrimination is attributable to the fact
that the DDA follows the "recognized Australian model of
prohibiting discrimination on certain grounds when it takes place
in certain defined areas."326  This model creates a dichotomy
wherein discrimination on the grounds of disability is prohibited in
321. Such as problems that result from omitting certain disabilities from the Act's
protection, despite the fact that congressional intent dictates their inclusion. See
discussion supra notes 284-285 and accompanying text. Examples include: diabetes,
epilepsy, hypertension, and monocular vision. See generally id.
322. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
323. See id. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (defining the term "discriminate," to include "not
making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an
otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant or employee . .
324. Bourke, supra note 83, at 327.
325. Id.
326. Tyler, supra note 78, at 220 (emphases added).
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workplace hiring and firing decisions, but is permitted in employee
advancement and training decisions.
In the employment context, there is another significant
difference between the DDA and the ADA with respect to which
entities the legislation covers. Title I of the ADA only prohibits
disability discrimination by employers with fifteen or more
employees.327  In comparison, the DDA prohibits disability
discrimination by "all employers, regardless of the number of
employees."
328
6. Protecting, as Intended by Both U.S. and Australian
Legislatures, Individuals with Imputed or Perceived Disabilities
As both Acts recognize that the public's perception of and
reaction to individuals with disabilities is a large part of the
disability discrimination phenomenon, it is imperative that those
individuals "perceived as"329 having disabilities, or who have
disabilities "imputed to" 330 them, fall within the protected classes
of qualified individuals. These provisions should protect
individuals whose impairments are not substantially limiting, but
are perceived by others as substantially limiting, individuals who
have temporary disabilities,331 as well as individuals who have no
impairments but whom others perceive as having substantially
limiting impairments. Perceptions of disabilities are often more
substantially limiting than the disabilities themselves.
332
Erroneous perceptions based on "stereotypic assumptions" 333 are
precisely the type of discrimination against which both Acts were
designed to protect.
3 34
327. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A).
328. Tucker, supra note 12, at 24.
329. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C)(3). For the ADA "perceived disability" definition,
see supra note 28.
330. See DDA, 1992, § 4(k) (Austl.). For the DDA "imputed disabilities" provision,
see supra note 9.
331. See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.20) (1998) (providing that "temporary, non-
chronic impairments of short duration, with little or no long term or permanent impact,
are usually not disabilities.").
332. See Moberly, supra note 214, at 637.
333. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7).
334. See Moberly, supra note 214, at 637-638 n.265 ("It is of little solace to a person
denied employment to know that the employer's view of his or her condition is erroneous.
To such a person, the perception of the employer is as important as reality." (citation
omitted)).
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It is inconsistent with the purposes of the DDA and the ADA
"to relieve employers who . . . discriminate of liability if, although
they acted in a prohibited discriminatory manner, it later turns out
that their belief was in fact erroneous." 335 In order for the ADA
and the DDA to fulfill their purposes, "the key.., is that the
employer acted on the belief of a [disability].
336
Although comparison is impossible because there are no
Australian cases on point, hopefully, Australian courts will utilize
the DDA's "imputed" disabilities provision and refrain from the
over-zealous hesitancy that afflicts the U.S. courts' narrow
construction of the ADA's "perceived" disabilities provision.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The DDA is an exceptional law with "the potential to enable
people with disabilities to become fully participating members of
Australian society, if [among other things] the disability standards
are properly drafted [and enforced], and if the Act is interpreted in
the manner in which it was intended ..... ,337 Most importantly,
the DDA represents a significant step, however small, towards the
eventual elimination of disability discrimination in Australia.
Australia's progress in this anti-discrimination endeavor, however,
is impeded by its use of the complaint-based method. Punishing
discrimination after-the-fact is too slow a mechanism to bring
about the type of attitudinal change that Australia so desperately
requires.
It is often argued that "change in community attitudes can
never be achieved through legislation... [alone]. ' 338 Whether or
not this is true for Australia will only be seen in time. Until then,
people with disabilities, as well as "everyone to whom the DDA
applies, must be educated. ' 339 "[L]egislation is not supposed to be
the only tool through which the progress is achieved: it is precisely
the interaction of the legislation and other means of persuasion
that is likely to have an effect in changing attitudes." 340 "Research
and community education are very important in providing a
barrier-free environment and will interact with legislation to
335. Id. at 641.
336. Id. (footnote omitted).
337. TUCKER, supra note 11, at 20-21.
338. Tyler, supra note 78, at 226.
339. Tucker, supra note 12, at 18 (emphasis added).
340. Tyler, supra note 78, at 227.
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achieve this objective." 34 1 One of the DDA's primary objectives,
promoting recognition and acceptance of the disability
community's entitlement to equality,342 will be thwarted until the
Australian public receives such an education.
Although the ADA is described as a "virtual revolution" 343 in
recognizing the rights of the disability community, its definition of
disability still needs expansion. By ignoring the needs of certain
sectors of the disability community, the ADA hinders its own
progress. The ADA's goals must focus on eliminating all
discrimination against all members of the disability community,
including, for example, individuals with controlled impairments.
Application of the Sutton case will likely preclude this outcome
until the ADA undergoes amendment.
The most effective approach to ensuring the rights of
individuals with disabilities cannot be found either in the United
States' disability legislation or in its Australian counterpart, but in
a combination thereof. Nations looking to adopt or amend any
present disability legislation would be well advised to examine the
shortcomings in the ADA and DDA, and learn from the mistakes
made therein.
Both the United States and Australian legislatures should
amend their current disability discrimination laws. Congress must
expand the ADA's definition of "disability" to include
impairments such as asymptomatic diseases and physical
disfigurements. In addition, the protections for individuals with
controlled and intermittent disabilities must be reestablished.
Australia should adopt a "reasonable accommodation"
approach similar to the approach Congress intended for the ADA.
This approach has been referred to as the "essential key in making
anti-discrimination law work in the context of disability."' 344
Although the Australian Commonwealth applies a derivative of
the reasonable accommodation approach, the vagueness of the
DDA's approach compromises its effectiveness. It is still unclear
whether the DDA's "inherent requirements ' 345 concept requires
that a reasonable accommodation be made in deciding a person's
341. 1I (footnote omitted).
342. See DDA, 1992, § 3(c) (Austl.).
343. Trautz v. Weisman, 819 F. Supp. 282, 294 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). See also Moberly,
supra note 214, at 608 & n.32.
344. Quinn, supra note 174, para. 24.
345. DDA § 15(4)(a).
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capacity to perform the requirements of an employment
position.346
The reasonable accommodation approach is better suited to
deliver the protections that the HREOC undoubtedly intended the
DDA to provide for Australians with disabilities. For example, in
employment hiring practices, permitting a person with a disability
to qualify for protections if they can perform a job "with or
without reasonable accommodations," would most certainly be
more effective than requesting that the potential employer simply
ignore the disability. Further, protection against discrimination
must be provided for individuals with disabilities in all areas of
employment, not just with respect to hiring and firing decisions.
Finally, community education and awareness programs must
accompany any changes in either the DDA or the ADA.
Although the causes of discrimination are unknown, it is "clearly
related to unease, inexperience, and ignorance." 347 Although ease
and experience may only come in the future, ignorance can, and
must, be affirmatively eliminated in the present.
If the Australian legislature implements DDA guidelines for
reasonable accommodations and access regulations, and the
United States legislature modifies the ADA's defining language so
as to increase its inclusivity, both the DDA and the ADA may
become that which their respective drafters intended: truly
effective disability discrimination legislation.
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346. See generally Quinn, supra note 174, paras. 20-24.
347. Tyler, supra note 78, at 228.
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